Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series
Year 

Paper 

Antitrust and Competition Law Update: Tetra
Laval–A landmark judgement on EC Merger
Control
Ulrich Quack∗

∗

Claus-Dieter Ehlermann†

James Burling‡

John Ratliff∗∗

Suyong Kim††

Douglas Melamed‡‡

William Kolasky§

WilmerHale

†
‡
∗∗
††
‡‡
§

This working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commercially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.
http://law.bepress.com/wilmer/art51
Copyright c 2005 by the authors.

Antitrust and Competition Law Update: Tetra
Laval–A landmark judgement on EC Merger
Control
Ulrich Quack, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, James Burling, John Ratliff, Suyong
Kim, Douglas Melamed, and William Kolasky

Abstract

On 15 February 2005, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) dismissed the European Commission’s appeal in the Tetra Laval/Sidel merger case.2 The ECJ’s
judgment establishes two signi?cant principles that apply beyond the facts of this
particular case:The judgment con?rms that the Court of First Instance (CFI) for
all practical purposes will continue to be the ultimate arbiter of disputes about
the Commission’s use of evidence and economic assessment in merger control
proceedings. The ECJ has signaled that it will generally not entertain appeals asserting that the CFI engaged in excessive scrutiny of the Commission’s assessment
and therefore overstepped the permissible boundaries of judicial review. Had the
ECJ upheld the arguments raised by the Commission, this may well have had a
chilling effect on the CFI’s willingness to subject the Commission’s merger decisions to strict scrutiny. This in turn would have severely limited the effectiveness
of judicial review, in particular in the age of the Commission’s “more economicsbased approach” and the increasing importance of complex factual and economic
evidence in merger cases. • While the judgment does not preclude prohibition
of conglomerate mergers under the Merger Regulation, it imposes stringent legal
and practical constraints on the Commission’s ability to challenge such mergers
on the basis of “leveraging”- type theories of competitive harm: Finding that “the
chains of cause and effect [underlying leveraging theories] are dimly discernible,
uncertain, and dif?cult to establish”, the ECJ required a particularly high quality of
evidence to support a conclusion that the leveraging developments will occur following the merger. By requiring that the Commission examine on a case-by-case
basis whether behavioral commitments (such as not to bundle different products)

might be effective, the ECJ’s judgment makes it less likely that the Commission
will pursue leveraging theories in merger review. The judgment effectively compels the Commission to reassess its method of evaluating commitments, which
currently calls for the rejection of even the most carefully crafted long-term behavioral commitments that adequately address conglomerate concerns.
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Tetra Laval–A Landmark Judgment
1
on EC Merger Control
On 15 February 2005, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) dismissed the
European Commission’s appeal in
the Tetra Laval/Sidel merger case.2
The ECJ’s judgment establishes two
signiﬁcant principles that apply beyond
the facts of this particular case:
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• The judgment conﬁrms that the Court
of First Instance (CFI) for all practical
purposes will continue to be the
ultimate arbiter of disputes about the
Commission’s use of evidence and
economic assessment in merger control
proceedings. The ECJ has signaled that
it will generally not entertain appeals
asserting that the CFI engaged in
excessive scrutiny of the Commission’s
assessment and therefore overstepped
the permissible boundaries of judicial
review. Had the ECJ upheld the
arguments raised by the Commission,
this may well have had a chilling effect
on the CFI’s willingness to subject the
Commission’s merger decisions to
strict scrutiny. This in turn would have
severely limited the effectiveness of
judicial review, in particular in the age
of the Commission’s “more economicsbased approach” and the increasing

importance of complex factual and
economic evidence in merger cases.
• While the judgment does not preclude
prohibition of conglomerate mergers
under the Merger Regulation, it imposes
stringent legal and practical constraints
on the Commission’s ability to challenge
such mergers on the basis of “leveraging”type theories of competitive harm:
o Finding that “the chains of cause and
effect [underlying leveraging theories]
are dimly discernible, uncertain,
and difﬁcult to establish”, the ECJ
required a particularly high quality
of evidence to support a conclusion
that the leveraging developments
will occur following the merger.
o By requiring that the Commission
examine on a case-by-case basis
whether behavioral commitments (such
as not to bundle different products)
might be effective, the ECJ’s judgment
makes it less likely that the Commission
will pursue leveraging theories
in merger review. The judgment
effectively compels the Commission
to reassess its method of evaluating
commitments, which currently calls
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1. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP represented Tetra Laval in the initial administrative
proceedings before the Commission, and was co-counsel in the litigation before the CFI and the ECJ.
2. Case C-12/03 P, Commission v. Tetra Laval, judgment of 15 February 2005, not yet
reported. In a second judgment (Case C-13/03 P) the ECJ declared as devoid of purpose
the Commission’s related action requesting the annulment of the CFI’s judgment that
rendered void the Commission’s divestiture decision in the Tetra Laval/Sidel case.
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for the rejection of even the most
carefully crafted long-term behavioral
commitments that adequately
address conglomerate concerns.

The Tetra Laval/Sidel Saga
The ECJ’s judgment ends a long-running
saga. Tetra Laval, through its Tetra Pak
business, is the leading manufacturer of
aseptic and non-aseptic carton packaging
systems. Sidel is a leader in PET packaging
equipment, in particular stretch-blow
molding (SBM) machines for making
empty PET bottles. In October 2001,
the Commission prohibited Tetra Laval’s
proposed acquisition of Sidel based on
conglomerate concerns. It argued that
the transaction would allow Tetra Laval
to leverage its market power into a
neighboring market, and eliminate potential
competition across packaging systems.
Tetra Laval appealed the prohibition
decision to the CFI, which in its judgment of
25 October 2002 comprehensively rejected
the Commission’s substantive assessment.
In the light of the CFI’s annulment of the
original Commission decision, Tetra Laval
re-notiﬁed the transaction for a second
review by the Commission. On 13 January
2003, the Commission approved the
transaction without opening a detailed
second-phase investigation. While the
Commission’s clearance decision allowed
Tetra Laval to close the transaction,
the Commission appealed the CFI’s
judgment to the ECJ on 8 January 2003.

“...not only must the
Community Courts, inter
alia, establish whether
the evidence relied on is
factually accurate, reliable
and consistent, but also
whether that evidence
contains all the
information which must
be taken into account
in order to assess a
complex situation and
whether it is capable
of substantiating
the conclusions
drawn from it.”

The Commission’s appeal raised
fundamental questions about the
standard of judicial review and the
Commission’s burden of proof in merger
cases generally, and with respect to
conglomerate mergers in particular. The
Commission’s appeal also questioned
the obligations imposed by the CFI to
take into account the possible illegality of
leveraging predicted by the Commission,
as well as behavorial commitments not
to engage in leveraging-type behavior.3

Standard of Judicial Review
At the core of the Commission’s appeal
was its claim that the CFI’s judgment
imposed too heavy a burden of proof
on the Commission when reviewing
mergers and thereby departed from a
standard of judicial review previously
deﬁned by the Community Courts. The
Commission argued that in its judgment,
rather than requiring a body of “cogent
and consistent” evidence, the CFI had
obligated the Commission to produce
“convincing evidence” when challenging
a merger. According to the Commission,
this “new” standard unduly limited the
discretion it needed to have in cases
involving complex factual and economic
matters. The Commission argued that
the CFI had effectively transformed
its role into that of a body with full
competence to rule on matters in all their
complexity and thus entitled to substitute
its views for those of the Commission.
The ECJ disagreed with the Commission’s
views. In the ECJ’s words, “not only
must the Community Courts, inter alia,
establish whether the evidence relied
on is factually accurate, reliable and
consistent, but also whether that evidence
contains all the information which must
be taken into account in order to assess a
complex situation and whether it is capable
of substantiating the conclusions drawn
from it” (para. 39, emphasis added). On
that basis, the CFI’s requirement that
proof of the anti-competitive effects of a
merger calls for “a precise examination,
supported by convincing evidence, of the
circumstances which allegedly produce
those effects” is not a new standard
imposed upon the Commission, but simply
a reﬂection of the essential function of
evidence, which is to establish convincingly
the merits of a merger decision.
The ECJ did not adopt the view suggested
by Advocate General Tizzano, that the
division of power between the Commission

3. The Commission also appealed on three other grounds that are more speciﬁc to the facts
at issue in the case. The ECJ rejected all of these as either inadmissible or unfounded.
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and the Community judicature did not
allow the CFI “to enter into the merits
of the Commission’s complex economic
assessment or to substitute its own point
of view for that of the institution”.4 The
ECJ in particular did not share Tizzano’s
criticism that the CFI had substituted its
own judgment for that of the Commission
with regard to an important part of the
analysis, i.e., the predicted growth of
PET packaging for a number of “sensitive”
beverages. Unlike the Advocate General,
the ECJ dismissed the Commission’s
arguments in this respect in two short
paragraphs. The ECJ pointed out that
these arguments relate to ﬁndings of fact
that the CFI was able to base on various
items in the contested decision itself.
The ECJ thus conﬁrmed the fundamental
role of the CFI in the review of merger
cases. While the CFI will continue to
exercise judicial self-restraint with respect
to technical questions, the need to respect
the Commission’s “margin of discretion”
will not prevent the CFI from looking
closely at the Commission’s analysis. This
is particularly important in view of the
increasingly sophisticated economic
analysis and evidence that is offered up in
contested merger cases. For the merging
parties, the length of proceedings before
the CFI already limits the effectiveness
of judicial review as a practical matter.
Shielding the Commission’s decisions
from judicial scrutiny simply because of
the apparent complexity of the economic
assessment would have made litigation
in merger cases even less of an option.

Burden of Proof and
Presumptions
The ECJ also addressed the Commission’s
burden of proof in merger cases generally

and conglomerate merger cases speciﬁcally.
The ECJ referred to the difﬁculties inherent
in merger review and noted that “a
prospective analysis of the kind necessary
in merger control must be carried out with
great care since it does not entail the
examination of past events [...], but rather a
prediction of events which are more or less
likely to occur in [the] future if a decision
prohibiting the planned concentration or
laying down the conditions for it is not
adopted” (para. 42, emphasis added).
For conglomerate mergers, the ECJ made
more explicit the evidentiary obligation
it expects the Commission to discharge:
“The analysis of a “conglomerate-type”
concentration is a prospective analysis
in which, ﬁrst, the consideration of a
lengthy period of time in the future and,
secondly, the leveraging necessary to
give rise to a signiﬁcant impediment to
effective competition means that the
chains of cause and effect are dimly
discernible, uncertain and difﬁcult to
establish. That being so, the quality of the
evidence produced by the Commission
[...] is particularly important.” (para.
44). The ECJ highlighted the difﬁculties
inherent in proving a leveraging theory5
and endorsed the “hard look” at the
evidentiary record performed by the CFI.
Interestingly, the ECJ did not explicitly
address the Commission’s argument that
this burden of proof effectively creates
a presumption in favor of the legality
of mergers (or at least conglomerate
mergers), whereas the Merger Regulation
imposes “symmetrical” obligations upon
the Commission–meaning that it has
to meet the same standard of proof
regardless of whether it is clearing or
prohibiting a transaction.6 The Advocate
General had explicitly rejected the

While the CFI will
continue to exercise
judicial self-restraint
with respect to technical
questions, the need to
respect the Commission's
“margin of discretion”
will not prevent the CFI
from looking closely
at the Commission's
analysis. This is
particularly important in
view of the increasingly
sophisticated economic
analysis and evidence
that is offered up in
contested merger cases.

4. Opinion of AG Tizzano of 25 May 2004, not yet reported, para. 89.
5. See Völcker, Leveraging as a theory of competitive harm after Tetra Laval,
40 C.M.L.Rev. 581-614 (2003).
6. According to Article 2(2) ECMR (in its amended version), “a concentration which would
not signiﬁcantly impede effective competition in the common market [...] shall be declared
compatible with the common market”. On the other hand, according to Article 2(3) ECMR (in
its amended version), “a concentration which would signiﬁcantly impede effective competition
in the common market [...] shall be declared incompatible with the common market”.
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Commission’s “symmetry” argument,
holding that in the “grey area” of cases in
which it is particularly difﬁcult to foresee
the effects of the notiﬁed transaction, the
Commission is under an obligation to clear
the transaction. The Advocate General
based this conclusion on the fact that
the Merger Regulation provides that any
transaction is deemed to be cleared if the
Commission fails to make a decision within
the time limits prescribed in the Merger
Regulation, and that Article 82 allows for
ex-post control of the combined entity.7
The ECJ did not embrace the theory,
but it also chose to leave the Advocate
General’s opinion as persuasive authority
for future “grey zone” evidentiary cases.

While there is uncertainty
as to how an “illegality
defense” will be
incorporated in the
analysis, the ECJ's
acceptance of behavioral
commitments may make
this a moot question for
all practical purposes,
because merging parties
may incorporate the
legal standards into
their commitments.

Illegality of Alleged
Leveraging Conduct
According to the CFI’s judgment, the
Commission was required to consider
whether a company’s incentive to
engage in leveraging practices may be
“reduced, or even eliminated, owing to
the illegality of the conduct in question,
the likelihood of its detection, action
taken by the competent authorities,
both at Community and national level,
and the ﬁnancial penalties which could
ensue” (CFI judgment, para. 159).
The ECJ agreed with the CFI insofar
as it required the Commission to
examine the likelihood of leveraging
comprehensively, taking into account both
the relevant incentives and disincentives
for such conduct. The ECJ also viewed the
“possibility that the conduct is unlawful” as
a relevant disincentive (para. 74). However,
it then held that “it would run counter
to the [Merger] Regulation’s purpose of
prevention” to require the Commission
to engage in the kind of “exhaustive and
detailed examination of the rules of various
legal orders [...] and of the enforcement
policy practiced in them.” The ECJ viewed
7.

such an assessment as “too speculative”
and to require it “would not allow the
Commission to base its assessment on
all of the relevant facts with a view to
establishing whether they support an
economic scenario in which a development
such as leveraging will occur” (para. 77).
The implications of the ECJ’s
pronouncements are not entirely clear, in
particular because the ECJ did not spell
out the legal or practical objections to
the CFI’s test. The judgment does not
appear to be saying that the unlawfulness
of the stipulated leveraging conduct is
irrelevant. Indeed, the judgment could
be read as suggesting that where there
is a high probability that the stipulated
conduct constitutes an infringement of
Article 82 or that the illegal conduct is
essential for leveraging to occur, the
Commission should take this into
account.8 While there is uncertainty as
to how an “illegality defense” will be
incorporated in the analysis, the ECJ’s
acceptance of behavioral commitments
(discussed below) may make this a moot
question for all practical purposes, because
merging parties may incorporate the
legal standards into their commitments.

Behavioral Remedies
During the administrative proceedings,
Tetra Laval had offered a set of
commitments, some of which were
behavioral in nature. In particular, Tetra
Laval had conﬁrmed its pre-existing pricing
commitments from the Tetra Pak II Article
82 case and committed not to bundle
Tetra Pak’s carton packaging products
and Sidel’s SBM machines. According
to the Commission–which had quickly
dismissed Tetra Laval’s commitments
in the administrative proceedings–such
commitments amounted to little
more than a promise to refrain from
engaging in illegal conduct and were

Opinion of AG Tizzano, paras. 75-81.

8. “Moreover, if it is to be relevant, such an assessment calls for a high probability
of the occurrence of the acts envisaged as capable of giving rise to objections on
the ground that they are part of anti-competitive conduct” (para. 76).
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therefore insufﬁcient under the principles
established in the Gencor case.9

be perceived in the future, after (possibly
anti-competitive) conduct has taken place.

The ECJ distinguished the facts at stake in
the Tetra Laval case from those that had
led to the CFI’s dismissal of behavioraltype commitments in Gencor. Contrary
to Gencor, in Tetra Laval the creation of
dominance in the SBM market would only
take place as a result of leveraging Tetra
Laval’s power on the neighboring carton
market, in particular through abusive
conduct. In the ECJ’s view, in this type
of scenario where structural changes will
only be brought about after some conduct
has taken place, commitments relating to
the merged entity’s future conduct may
prove an adequate remedy for preventing
such conduct from occurring in the ﬁrst
place. On that basis, the ECJ upheld the
CFI’s ﬁnding that the Commission’s straight
rejection, “as a matter of principle”, of
behavioral remedies could not be sustained.

Conclusion

The ECJ’s judgment thus conﬁrmed that
well-crafted behavioral remedies may
validly serve to alleviate the Commission’s
concerns in conglomerate cases. In fact,
in a scenario such as that presented
in the Tetra Laval case, a behavioral
commitment may be the only effective
remedy that is available, because the
structural effects of an operation will only

This letter is for general informational purposes only
and does not represent our legal advice as to any
particular set of facts, nor does this letter represent
any undertaking to keep recipients advised as to all
relevant legal developments.
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP is
a Delaware limited liability partnership. Our
UK offices are operated under a separate
Delaware limited liability partnership.
© 2005 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

The ECJ’s Tetra Laval judgment is the
most signiﬁcant clariﬁcation of EC merger
review since Gencor. In conjunction with
the CFI’s judgment, the ECJ’s judgment
provides a tighter (and more coherent)
framework for the analysis of all mergers,
but particularly conglomerate mergers.
The requirement that the Commission
consider the possibility that the behavioral
remedies offered by the merging
parties may be sufﬁcient to alleviate the
Commission’s anti-competitive concerns
is a welcome development. This and
other holdings in Tetra Laval may be
an important pre-cursor for the CFI’s
review of the pending GE/Honeywell case,
where similar issues have been raised.

ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION
LAW UPDATE

The ECJ’s judgment also has broader
implications, including as to the allocation
of functions between the Commission as
an administrative body and the Community
Courts as a review body. The ECJ’s
judgment is an important reminder that
the Community Courts will be ready to
vigorously scrutinize the Commission’s
assessment of mergers in light of the
evidence that has been adduced.

Please contact any of us if you have any
questions about these developments.
Berlin:
Ulrich Quack
ulrich.quack@wilmerhale.com
Boston:
James C. Burling
james.burling@wilmerhale.com
Brussels:
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann
claus-dieter.ehlermann@wilmerhale.com
John Ratliff
john.ratliff@wilmerhale.com
London:
Suyong Kim
suyong.kim@wilmerhale.com
Washington:
Douglas Melamed
doug.melamed@wilmerhale.com
William J. Kolasky
william.kolasky@wilmerhale.com

9. Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission, judgment of 25 March 1999, 1999 ECR II-753.
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